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DOUBLE JEOPARDY
United States Constitution Amendment V:
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.
New York Constitution Article I, Section 6:
[N]o person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense ....
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE ]DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Boone'
(Decided October 1, 2001.)
Darrel Boone sought review of a jury verdict convicting
him of first degree manslaughter.2 Boone claimed that his motion
for a mistrial based on misconduct of the prosecutor barred his re-
prosecution and conviction under a theory of double jeopardy.
3
Boone argued that after his motion for a mistrial, a continuance of
the trial offended the double jeopardy clauses of both the United
States Constitution4 and the New York State Constitution.5 The
appellate court held that because the prosecution did not act with
deliberate misconduct intending to provoke ]Boone into requesting
a mistrial, Boone's prosecution was not barred by the theory of
'287 A.D.2d 461, 731 N.Y.S.2d 73 (2d Dep't 2001).
2 Boone, 287 A.D.2d at 462, 731 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "[Nor shall any person be
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 provides in pertinent part: "[N]o person shall be
subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense ...."
1
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double jeopardy. 6  However, the court held that a sentence
reduction was warranted.7
At the time of his arrest, Boone was a forty-two year old
father of three, who had no criminal record and was gainfully
employed.8 Boone's fourteen year old daughter had been sexually
assaulted by two men at gun point.9 While visiting her at the
hospital, he learned the identification of one of his daughter's
assailants.10  He then returned to his apartment, located an
unlicensed gun and a hammer and went in pursuit of the seventeen
year old young man." Boone proceeded to accuse the alleged
assailant and despite the young man's denial, Boone shot and beat
him to death. 12 Boone admitted to his actions and cooperated with
the police, expressing remorse throughout the proceeding.'
3
Despite psychiatric experts for both sides testifying that the
defendant had acted under extreme emotional disturbance and had
virtually "snapped," Boone was found guilty of manslaughter.'
4
He was sentenced to an indeterminate term of seven-to-fourteen
years imprisonment.' 
5
On appeal, the sentence was reduced to an indeterminate
term of four-to-eight years imprisonment because the appellate
court, in exercising its judicial discretion, found that the
extraordinary circumstances warranted a reduction but not a
dismissal of the charges.' 6 The appellant claimed that the jury trial
resulting in his conviction was the product of a mistrial and that his
retrial should have been barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of
both the United States Constitution' 7 and the New York
Constitution. 18 In reviewing the record, the court found that
6 Boone, 287 A.D.2d at 462, 731 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
7 id.
I d. at 463, 731 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
9 Id.
10 1 d.
1 Boone, 287 A.D.2d at 463, 731 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
12id.
1 d. at 462, 731 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
14 id.
'51d.
16 Boone, 287 A.D.2d at 462, 731 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
IS N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; see also Boone, 287 A.D.2d at 462, 731 N.Y.S.2d at
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although the prosecution elicited evidence that may have been
somewhat prejudicial and was irrelevant to the case at hand, the
prosecution did not act with the level of misconduct that
constituted overreaching. 19 The court reasoned. that, while the
prosecutor improperly elicited the irrelevant information, he did
not do so with the goal of provoking Boone into requesting a
mistrial.2 ° Overreaching triggers double jeopardy protection and
bars re-prosecution. 2 1  The appellate court held that double
jeopardy did not bar the retrial.22
In reaching its decision on the issue of double jeopardy, the
appellate court relied on the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Oregon v. Kennedy23 which defined prosecutorial
overreaching. 24 In this case, the defendant was accused of stealing
an oriental carpet.2 5 The prosecution asked a witness whether he
refused to do business with the defendant because he thought the
defendant was a 'crook.' 26 The state court of appeals in Kennedy
reasoned that the prosecutor's misconduct constituted overreaching
and had provoked the defendant into requesting a mistrial.
27
Therefore, a second trial was barred under double jeopardy
theory.28 The United States Supreme Court concluded that while
the state court of appeals had relied on appropriate federal
constitutional analysis, it had taken an overly expansive view when
applying the Double Jeopardy Clause and had redefined the
perimeters of what constituted prosecutorial overreaching. 29 The
Court differentiated between double jeopardy issues raised by the
declaration of a mistrial over the objections of a defendant, such as
in the case of a hung jury, from a mistrial declared at the request of
the defendant.30 In the former situation, a showing of "manifest




23 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
24 Id. at 667-70.
25 id. at 669.
26 id.
27 id. at 668.
28 Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 668.
29 Id.
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necessity" by the state defeats the Double Jeopardy Clause, while
in the latter case double jeopardy is not a bar to retrial unless it
falls within a narrow exception.
3 1
Accordingly, in United States v. Dinitz, the United States
Supreme Court held that a retrial was not barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause because the judge did not act with bad faith when
he expelled the defendant's attorney and granted the defendant's
motion for mistrial.32 To constitute bad faith, the judge would
have had to act with the intent to prejudice the defendant's chance
of acquittal, thus constituting overreaching. 33 The Court went on
to explain that if the misconduct was specifically meant to "goad
the defendant into requesting a mistrial. .. [then] the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars retrials where bad faith conduct by a judge or
prosecutor threatens the harassment of an accused by successive
prosecutions or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the
prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict the
defendant." 34 Justice Stevens' concurrence enumerates possible
reasons that a prosecutor might provoke a defendant to request a
mistrial, "in order to shop for [a] more favorable trier of fact, or to
correct deficiencies in his case, or to obtain an unwarranted
preview of the defendant's evidence."
35
To make a determination if such an intent on the part of the
prosecutor exists, the court must make a finding of fact by
examining the objective facts and circumstances. 36 If the record
shows the conduct was intended to goad the defendant to make a
motion for a mistrial, the defendant in a criminal case can raise the
31 424 U.S. 600, 606 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977) (defining
manifest necessity as a doctrine). In this case, "manifest necessity" was defined
as the defendant having "no choice" but to request a mistrial. See also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 963 (6TH ed. 1990) ("Doctrine of 'manifest
necessity' which will authorize granting of mistrial in a criminal case, and
preclude defendant from successfully raising plea of former jeopardy,
contemplates a sudden and overwhelming emergency beyond control of
court ... it becomes no longer possible to conduct trial or to reach a fair result
based upon the evidence.").32 Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611.
33 id.
34 Kennedy, 45 U.S. at 674 (quoting Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 611); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
35 Id. at 686 (Stevens, J., concurring).36 Id. at 675.
[Vol 18
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bar of double jeopardy. 37 Where prosecutorial misconduct is a
factor, double jeopardy provides protection of the defendant's
rights by giving the defendant the limited option to continue with a
tainted proceeding or begin anew. 38 The defendant's interests in
barring a second effort to prosecute him must be balanced against
society's interest in giving the prosecutor a full and fair
opportunity to present all of the evidence to a jury.39 Therefore,
the defendant's ability to invoke this double jeopardy protection is
narrowly limited to situations in which the prosecutor intended to
provoke a mistrial by overreaching or harassment of the
defendant. 40  It is the defendant's burden to prove that the
exception to overreaching exists and that he is, therefore, entitled
to claim the protection of double jeopardy.4 1 Additionally, Chief
Justice Burger, in his concurrence, noted that nothing in the
Court's holding was meant to prevent a state court from finding
that even though the Federal Constitution may not dictate a double
jeopardy violation in a particular case, a state constitution may
extend the protection and conclude that a defendant's retrial would
violate its own state constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause.42
. New York state courts have interpreted the New York
Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause4 3 in much the same way as
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal
Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause.44 The New York appellate
court in Boone relied on Davis v. Brown45 in holding that because
the prosecution did not act with deliberate misconduct intending to
provoke the defendant into requesting a mistrial, the defendant's
retrial was not barred by double jeopardy.4 In Davis, two
witnesses for the prosecution, prodded by the prosecution,
introduced evidence that had been prohibited by the court in a
37 Id. at 676.
38 Id. at 686.
39 Kennedy, 45 U.S. at 684.
40 id. at 684.
41 id.
42 Id. at 680 (Brennan, J., concurring).
43 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
44 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
45 87 N.Y.2d 626, 664 N.E.2d 884,641 N.Y.S.2d 819 (1996).
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pretrial order.47 The petitioner specifically requested a mistrial
with prejudice, but the court granted a mistrial without prejudice,
with the result that the petitioner was blocked from raising a bar to
48his retrial based on double jeopardy. However, the New York
Court of Appeals held that the petitioner could not be retried
because it would violate double jeopardy. 49 The court reasoned
that when a prosecutor engages in deliberate and prejudicial
misconduct designed to cause a mistrial, a mistrial should be
granted and any attempt at retrial should be barred. 0 Conversely,
so long as it was found that the prosecutor's actions were not
specifically intended to produce a mistrial, the case may be retried
even if his conduct was improper.
5 '
Other recent New York cases interpreting New York
State's Double Jeopardy Clause 52 have largely relied on federal
case law to delineate the boundaries, thus proving that the two
clauses are interpreted much the same.53 In State v. Hart,54 the
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment,
despite the prosecutor's eliciting information from a witness that
was prohibited by the court's pretrial ruling.55 The Appellate
Court, Second Department, held that double jeopardy did not bar
retrial, as the record did not support the conclusion that the
prosecutor acted in bad faith or intended to provoke the defendant
into moving for a mistrial.56 In the New York case of State v.
47 Davis, 87 N.Y.2d at 628, 664 N.E.2d at 886, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
48 Id. (emphasis added).
49 id.
50 id.
5'id. at 631, 664 N.E.2d at 889, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 824.52 N.Y. CONST. art. I § 6.
53 See Davis, 87 N.Y.2d at 626, 664 N.E.2d at 884, 641 N.Y.S.2d at 627; State
v. Hart, 216 A.D.2d 486, 628 N.Y.S.2d 743 (2d Dep't 1995); State v. Mitchell,
197 A.D.2d 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d 923 (2d Dep't 1993); Roman v. Brown, 175
A.D.2d 899, 573 N.Y.S.2d 627 (2d Dep't 1971); State v. Copeland, 127 A.D.2d
846, 511 N.Y.S.2d 949 (2d Dep't 1987). All of these courts relied heavily on
the case of Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
14 216 A.D.2d 486, 628 N.Y.S.2d 743 (precluding the prosecutor from eliciting
hearsay statements from the police detective/witness as to the defendant's
connection with the drugs).
51 Id. at 487, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 744.56 1d.
190 [Vol 18
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Mitchell,57 the prosecutor referred to the defendant as a "pirnp.,,58
The second department of the New York appellate division relied
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v.
Kennedy,59 holding "absent a bad faith intent, the misconduct does
not constitute the type of prosecutorial overreaching contemplated
by the United States Supreme Court as requirin'z the barring of
reprosecution on the ground of double jeopardy." '  Likewise, in
Roman v. Brown,61 in denying that the Double Jeopardy Clause
barred retrial, the Appellate Court, Second Department relied on
the same holding in Kennedy and specifically added that a retrial
was not prohibited by the New York State Constitution's Double
Jeopardy Clause.62
In State v. Copeland,63 the prosecution, despite the court's
instructions to the contrary, repeatedly referred to the fact that the
defendant had maintained silence for three hours after his arrest in
an attempt to impeach defendant's testimony.64 Upon review of
the case, the Appellate Court, Second Department, relied on Dinitz,
using almost identical language in its decision to deny defendant's
motion to dismiss and bar retrial despite the prosecutor's
intentional and damaging inference.65 The court in Copeland
embraced the holding in Dinitz and concluded, "absent a bad-faith
intent, the misconduct does not constitutethat type of prosecutorial
overreaching contemplated by the United States Supreme Court as
requiring the barring of re-prosecution on the ground of double
jeopardy." 66
Finally, in State v. Key67 the New York Court of Appeals
concluded that recent decisions in the United States Supreme Court
did not affect established New York law in the area of double
57 Mitchell, 197 A.D.2d at 709, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 923.
Id. at 710, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
456 U.S. at 667 (1982).
6o Mitchell, 197 A.D.2d at 710, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 924.
61 175 A.D.2d at 899, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
62 id.
63 127 A.D.2d at 846, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
64 Id. at 847, 511 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
65 id.
66 id.
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jeopardy.68 In Key, the trial court dismissed the case on the
defendant's motion. Subsequent to jury selection, the defendant
learned the traffic information and deposition provided by the state
did not allege a necessary element of the crime.69 While the trial
court held that retrial was barred by double jeopardy, the appellate
court, reversed and the Court of Appeals affirmed.7u The Court of
Appeals, in reviewing New York law, held that if an accusatory
instrument is so defective that it cannot support a conviction, then
double jeopardy does not attach and a retrial on a corrected
instrument is not barred.71  Retrial is allowed for a dismissal
granted on the motion of a defendant as long as that dismissal is
not based on any adjudication of the facts that pertain to his guilt.
This rule is applicable even if double jeopardy has attached before
the dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals, having reviewed
United States Supreme Court decisions, found that the cases could
be divided into two groups - cases in which the proceedings are
terminated in favor of the defendant and do not permit a retrial,
and cases that are dismissed on a motion of the defendant based on
an error and that error is not caused by bad faith or an intent to
provoke a mistrial.73 This latter group of cases does not bar
reprosecution based on double jeopardy.74 The court maintained
that "following the [United States] Supreme Court's latest
explanation of its earlier double jeopardy holdings, it appears
unnecessary to abandon traditional New York Law in this area."75
In the area of double jeopardy, New York law based on the
New York Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause seems to follow
68 Id. at 120, 379 N.E.2d at 1158, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
69 Id. at 114, 379 N.E.2d at 1149, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (finding that neither the
original information nor the deposition asserted that the car was actually in
operation or that the defendant was driving, a necessary element of the DWI
charge).70 id.
"' Id. at 117, 379 N.E.2d 't 1150,408 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
72 Key, 45 N.Y.2d at 117, 379 N.E.2d at 1150,408 N.Y.S.2d at 13.
" Id. at 119, 379 N.E. 2d at 1151, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 18 (holding that as the
defendant had moved for dismissal based on defective pleading, and as there had
been no adjudication on the facts related to his innocence or guilt, the defendant
was not in a position to request a dismissal based on a double jeopardy bar to his
retrial).
74 Id.
" Id. at 120, 379 N.E.2d at 1152, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
[Vol 18
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the same interpretation as that of federal law based on the Federal
Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. In order to bar retrial
under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States
Constitution, the prosecutorial or judicial misconduct must reach a
level of overreaching in bad faith as defined by the United States
Supreme Court in Kennedy and its progeny.7" This interpretation
of double jeopardy protection is reflected in New York
jurisprudence.77 Only in a situation in which the record shows that
a dismissal was the result of intentional judicial or prosecutorial
misconduct with the goal of provoking the defendant into
requesting a mistrial so as to gain an advantage in a second trial,
will the protection of double jeopardy be afforded to prohibit a
retrial. 78
Diane Somberg
76 Kennedy, 45 U.S. at 674.
77 Key, 45 N.Y.2d at 120, 379 N.E.2d at 1152, 408. N.Y.S.2d at 19; see also
Hart, 216 A.D.2d at 486, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 743; Mitchell, 197 A.D.2d at 709, 602
N.Y.S.2d at 923; Roman, 175 A.D.2d at 894, 573 N.Y.S.2d at 627.




Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002
TOURO LAW REVIEW
[This page intentionally left blank]
[Vol 18
10
Touro Law Review, Vol. 18 [2002], No. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/4
